The Interrogator: Protocol Secuity Analysis
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering - Special issue on computer security and privacy
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Towards a completeness result for model checking of security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Communications of the ACM
Verifying security protocols as planning in logic programming
ACM Transactions on Computational Logic (TOCL) - Special issue devoted to Robert A. Kowalski
Constraint solving for bounded-process cryptographic protocol analysis
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Analyzing security protocols with secrecy types and logic programs
POPL '02 Proceedings of the 29th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
The Theory and Practice of Concurrency
The Theory and Practice of Concurrency
FLOPS '01 Proceedings of the 5th International Symposium on Functional and Logic Programming
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
Kerberos Version 4: Inductive Analysis of the Secrecy Goals
ESORICS '98 Proceedings of the 5th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
Formal Verification of Cryptographic Protocols: A Survey
ASIACRYPT '94 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology: Advances in Cryptology
Lazy Infinite-State Analysis of Security Protocols
Proceedings of the International Exhibition and Congress on Secure Networking - CQRE (Secure) '99
Modelling and verifying key-exchange protocols using CSP and FDR
CSFW '95 Proceedings of the 8th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Casper: A Compiler for the Analysis of Security Protocols
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Meta-Notation for Protocol Analysis
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Relating Strands and Multiset Rewriting for Security Protocol Analysis
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Tool for Lazy Verification of Security Protocols
Proceedings of the 16th IEEE international conference on Automated software engineering
An Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Verifier Based on Prolog Rules
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Protocol Insecurity with Finite Number of Sessions is NP-Complete
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Automated analysis of cryptographic protocols using Mur/spl phi/
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Compiling and verifying security protocols
LPAR'00 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Logic for programming and automated reasoning
Efficient Real-Time Model Checking Using Tabled Logic Programming and Constraints
ICLP '02 Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Logic Programming
An Improved Constraint-Based System for the Verification of Security Protocols
SAS '02 Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Static Analysis
Timed model checking of security protocols
Proceedings of the 2004 ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
Timed analysis of security protocols
Journal of Computer Security - Formal Methods in Security Engineering Workshop (FMSE 04)
A 25-year perspective on logic programming
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In this paper we define a sequent calculus to formally specify, simulate, debug and verify security protocols. In our sequents we distinguish between the current knowledge of principals and the current global state of the session. Hereby, we can describe the operational semantics of principals and of an intruder in a simple and modular way. Furthermore, using proof theoretic tools like the analysis of permutability of rules, we are able to find efficient proof strategies that we prove complete for special classes of security protocols including Needham-Schroeder. Based on the results of this preliminary analysis, we have implemented a Prolog meta-interpreter which allows for rapid prototyping and for checking safety properties of security protocols, and we have applied it for finding error traces and proving correctness of practical examples.