Computing Symbolic Models for Verifying Cryptographic Protocols

  • Authors:
  • Marcelo Fiore;Martín Abadi

  • Affiliations:
  • -;-

  • Venue:
  • CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
  • Year:
  • 2001

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Abstract

Abstract: We consider the problem of automatically verifying infinite-state cryptographic protocols. Specifically, we present an algorithm that given a finite process describing a protocol in a hostile environment (trying to force the system into a "bad" state) computes a model of traces on which security properties can be checked. Because of unbounded inputs from the environment, even finite processes have an infinite set of traces; the main focus of our approach is the reduction of this infinite set to a finite set by a symbolic analysis of the knowledge of the environment. Our algorithm is sound (and we conjecture complete) for protocols with shared-key encryption/decryption that use arbitrary messages as keys; further it is complete in the common and important case in which the cryptographic keys are messages of bounded size.