Foundations of logic programming; (2nd extended ed.)
Foundations of logic programming; (2nd extended ed.)
A Model for Secure Protocols and Their Compositions
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Verifying Authentication Protocols in CSP
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Strand spaces: proving security protocols correct
Journal of Computer Security
Mobile values, new names, and secure communication
POPL '01 Proceedings of the 28th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Constraint solving for bounded-process cryptographic protocol analysis
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Experimenting with STA, a tool for automatic analysis of security protocols
Proceedings of the 2002 ACM symposium on Applied computing
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
On the symbolic reduction of processes with cryptographic functions
Theoretical Computer Science
The Game of the Name in Cryptographic Tables
ASIAN '99 Proceedings of the 5th Asian Computing Science Conference on Advances in Computing Science
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
A Framework for the Analysis of Security Protocols
CONCUR '02 Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Concurrency Theory
Protocol insecurity with a finite number of sessions and composed keys is NP-complete
Theoretical Computer Science
Intruder Deductions, Constraint Solving and Insecurity Decision in Presence of Exclusive or
LICS '03 Proceedings of the 18th Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science
An NP Decision Procedure for Protocol Insecurity with XOR
LICS '03 Proceedings of the 18th Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science
Modelling and verifying key-exchange protocols using CSP and FDR
CSFW '95 Proceedings of the 8th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Hierarchy of Authentication Specifications
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
How to Prevent Type Flaw Attacks on Security Protocols
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Security Analysis of the Cliques Protocols Suites
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
An Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Verifier Based on Prolog Rules
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Computing Symbolic Models for Verifying Cryptographic Protocols
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Automated analysis of cryptographic protocols using Mur/spl phi/
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Verification of cryptographic Protocols: tagging enforces termination
FOSSACS'03/ETAPS'03 Proceedings of the 6th International conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computation Structures and joint European conference on Theory and practice of software
RTA'03 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Rewriting techniques and applications
Proceedings of the 10th international ACM SIGPLAN conference on Principles and practice of declarative programming
A Complete Symbolic Bisimulation for Full Applied Pi Calculus
SOFSEM '10 Proceedings of the 36th Conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science
Rethinking about guessing attacks
Proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
A complete symbolic bisimulation for full applied pi calculus
Theoretical Computer Science
Hi-index | 5.23 |
In security protocols, message exchange between the intruder and honest participants induces a form of state explosion which makes protocol models infinite. We propose a general method for automatic analysis of security protocols based on the notion of frame, essentially a rewrite system plus a set of distinguished terms called messages. Frames are intended to model generic crypto-systems. Based on frames, we introduce a process language akin to Abadi and Fournet's applied pi. For this language, we define a symbolic operational semantics that relies on unification and provides finite and effective protocol models. Next, we give a method to carry out trace analysis directly on the symbolic model. We spell out a regularity condition on the underlying frame, which guarantees completeness of our method for the considered class of properties, including secrecy and various forms of authentication. We show how to instantiate our method to some of the most common crypto-systems, including shared-and public-key encryption, hashing and Diffie-Hellman key exchange.