A calculus for cryptographic protocols: the spi calculus
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
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A method for symbolic analysis of security protocols
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CAV '09 Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Computer Aided Verification
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We present a name-passing calculus that can be regarded as a simplified π-calculus equipped with a cryptographic table. The latter is a data structure representing the relationships among names. We illustrate how the calculus may be used for modelling cryptographic protocols relying on symmetric shared keys and verifying secrecy and authenticity properties. Following classical approaches [3], we formulate the verification task as a reachability problem and prove its decidability assuming finite principals and bounds on the sorts of the messages synthesized by the attacker.