The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Reasoning about knowledge
Bounded model checking for the universal fragment of CTL
Fundamenta Informaticae
Verifying epistemic properties of multi-agent systems via bounded model checking
Fundamenta Informaticae - Concurrency specification and programming
Symbolic Model Checking the Knowledge of the Dining Cryptographers
CSFW '04 Proceedings of the 17th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A complete and decidable security-specialised logic and its application to the TESLA protocol
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Comparing BDD and SAT Based Techniques for Model Checking Chaum's Dining Cryptographers Protocol
Fundamenta Informaticae - SPECIAL ISSUE ON CONCURRENCY SPECIFICATION AND PROGRAMMING (CS&P 2005) Ruciane-Nide, Poland, 28-30 September 2005
Modelling and Checking Timed Authentication of Security Protocols
Fundamenta Informaticae - Special Issue on Concurrency Specification and Programming (CS&P)
An Optimized Intruder Model for SAT-based Model-Checking of Security Protocols
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
√erics: a tool for verifying timed automata and estelle specifications
TACAS'03 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Tools and algorithms for the construction and analysis of systems
The AVISPA tool for the automated validation of internet security protocols and applications
CAV'05 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Computer Aided Verification
MCMAS: a model checker for multi-agent systems
TACAS'06 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems
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We present a formalism for the automatic verification of security protocols based on multi-agent systems semantics. We give the syntax and semantics of a temporal-epistemic securityspecialised logic and provide a lazy-intruder model for the protocol rules that we argue to be particularly suitable for verification purposes. We exemplify the technique by finding a (known) bug in the traditional NSPK protocol.