A CSP formulation of non-interference and unwinding
Cipher: IEEE Computer Society Technical Committee Newsletter on Security & Privacy
A General Theory of Composition for a Class of "Possibilistic" Properties
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Secure information flow in a multi-threaded imperative language
POPL '98 Proceedings of the 25th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Secrecy by typing in security protocols
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Process algebra and non-interference
Journal of Computer Security
Communication and Concurrency
Information flow vs. resource access in the asynchronous pi-calculus
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)
Analysis of security protocols as open systems
Theoretical Computer Science
Mathematical Models of Computer Security
FOSAD '00 Revised versions of lectures given during the IFIP WG 1.7 International School on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design: Tutorial Lectures
Classification of Security Properties (Part I: Information Flow)
FOSAD '00 Revised versions of lectures given during the IFIP WG 1.7 International School on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design: Tutorial Lectures
ESORICS '96 Proceedings of the 4th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
Communication Interference in Mobile Boxed Ambients
FST TCS '02 Proceedings of the 22nd Conference Kanpur on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science
Securing Communication in a Concurrent Language
SAS '02 Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Static Analysis
What is Intransitive Noninterference?
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Probabilistic Noninterference for Multi-Threaded Programs
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Information Flow Security in Dynamic Contexts
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Non-Interference: Who Needs It?
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Absorbing covers and intransitive non-interference
SP '95 Proceedings of the 1995 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A general theory of security properties
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A process-algebraic approach for the analysis of probabilistic noninterference
Journal of Computer Security
A simple language for real-time cryptographic protocol analysis
ESOP'03 Proceedings of the 12th European conference on Programming
Verifying persistent security properties
Computer Languages, Systems and Structures
Language-based information-flow security
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Fundamenta Informaticae - SPECIAL ISSUE ON CONCURRENCY SPECIFICATION AND PROGRAMMING (CS&P 2005) Ruciane-Nide, Poland, 28-30 September 2005
Observation Based System Security
Fundamenta Informaticae - Special Issue on Concurrency Specification and Programming (CS&P)
Probabilistic Information Flow Security
Fundamenta Informaticae - Concurrency Specification and Programming (CS&P)
Towards Information Flow Properties for Distributed Systems
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Information-flow attacks based on limited observations
PSI'06 Proceedings of the 6th international Andrei Ershov memorial conference on Perspectives of systems informatics
Probabilistic Information Flow Security
Fundamenta Informaticae - Concurrency Specification and Programming (CS&P)
Observation Based System Security
Fundamenta Informaticae - Special Issue on Concurrency Specification and Programming (CS&P)
Fundamenta Informaticae - SPECIAL ISSUE ON CONCURRENCY SPECIFICATION AND PROGRAMMING (CS&P 2005) Ruciane-Nide, Poland, 28-30 September 2005
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Information flow Security in a multilevel system aims at guaranteeing that no high level information is revealed to low level user, even in the presence of any possible malicious process. This requirment could be stronger than necessary when some knowledge about the environment (context) in which the process is going to run is available. To relax this requirment we introduce the notion of secure contexts for a class of processes. This notion is parametric with respect to both the observation equivalance and the operation used to characterize the low level view of a process. As observation equivalance we consider the cases of weak bisimulation and trace equivalance. We describe how to build secure context in these cases and we show that two well-known security properties, named BNDC and NDC. are just special instances of our general notion.