Mathematical Models of Computer Security

• Authors: Peter Y. A. Ryan
• Venue: FOSAD '00 Revised versions of lectures given during the IFIP WG 1.7 International School on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design: Tutorial Lectures
• Year: 2000

In this chapter I present a process algebraic approach to the modelling of security properties and policies. I will concentrate on the concept of secrecy, also known as confidentiality, and in particular on the notion of non-interference. Non-interference seeks to characterise the absence of information flows through a system and, as such, is a fundamental concept in information security.A central thesis of these lectures is that, viewed from a process algebraic point of view, the problem of characterising non-interference is essentially equivalent to that of characterising the equivalence of processes. The latter is itself a fundamental and delicate question at the heart of process algebra and indeed theoretical computer science: the semantics of a process is intimately linked to the question of which processes should be regarded as equivalent.We start, by way of motivation and to set the context, with a brief historical background. A much fuller exposition of security policies in the wider sense, embracing properties other than secrecy, can be found in the chapter by Pierangela Samarati in this volume. We then cover some elements of process algebra, in particular CSP (Communicating Sequential Processes), that we need and present a formulation of noninterference, along with some more operational presentations of process algebra, including the idea of bi-simulation. I argue that the classical notion of unwinding found in the security literature is really just bisimulation in another guise.Finally, I propose some generalisations of the process algebraic formulations designed to encompass a richer class of policies and examples.