Strand spaces: proving security protocols correct
Journal of Computer Security
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Athena: a novel approach to efficient automatic security protocol analysis
Journal of Computer Security
Constraint solving for bounded-process cryptographic protocol analysis
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Freshness Assurance of Authentication Protocols
ESORICS '92 Proceedings of the Second European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
Protocol insecurity with a finite number of sessions and composed keys is NP-complete
Theoretical Computer Science
A Hierarchy of Authentication Specifications
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Athena: a New Efficient Automatic Checker for Security Protocol Analysis
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
SP '00 Proceedings of the 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Multiset rewriting and the complexity of bounded security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
An NP decision procedure for protocol insecurity with XOR
Theoretical Computer Science
A Logic for Constraint-based Security Protocol Analysis
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
The Insecurity Problem: Tackling Unbounded Data
CSF '07 Proceedings of the 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
A calculus of challenges and responses
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
Improving Techniques for Proving Undecidability of Checking Cryptographic Protocols
ARES '08 Proceedings of the 2008 Third International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security
Correcting and Improving the NP Proof for Cryptographic Protocol Insecurity
ICISS '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Information Systems Security
Secure time information in the internet key exchange protocol
Annales UMCS, Informatica - Security Systems
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Freshness is a central security issue for cryptographic protocols and is the security goal violated by replay attacks. This paper is the first to formally define freshness goal and its attacks based on role instances and the attacker's involvement, and is the first work to investigate the complexity of checking freshness. We discuss and prove a series of complexity results of checking freshness goals in several different scenarios, where the attacker's behavior is restricted differently, with different bounds on the number of role instances in a run.