On the security of ping-pong protocols when implemented using the RSA
Lecture notes in computer sciences; 218 on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO 85
Using one-way functions for authentication
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
An attack on the Needham-Schroeder public-key authentication protocol
Information Processing Letters
Verifying Authentication Protocols in CSP
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
An attack on a recursive authentication protocol. A cautionary tale
Information Processing Letters
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Communications of the ACM
The Theory and Practice of Concurrency
The Theory and Practice of Concurrency
Concurrent and Real Time Systems: The CSP Approach
Concurrent and Real Time Systems: The CSP Approach
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
Modelling and verifying key-exchange protocols using CSP and FDR
CSFW '95 Proceedings of the 8th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Hierarchy of Authentication Specifications
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Towards Automatic Verification of Authentication Protocols on an Unbounded Network
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
How to Prevent Type Flaw Attacks on Security Protocols
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Authenticity by Typing for Security Protocols
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
SP '95 Proceedings of the 1995 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
SP '96 Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
The modelling and analysis of security protocols: the csp approach
The modelling and analysis of security protocols: the csp approach
A formalism for visual security protocol modeling
Journal of Visual Languages and Computing
Slede: a domain-specific verification framework for sensor network security protocol implementations
WiSec '08 Proceedings of the first ACM conference on Wireless network security
A generic theorem prover of CSP refinement
TACAS'05 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems
A complete axiomatic semantics for the CSP stable-failures model
CONCUR'06 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Concurrency Theory
Verifying security protocols: an application of CSP
CSP'04 Proceedings of the 2004 international conference on Communicating Sequential Processes: the First 25 Years
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Formal methods for verifying authentication protocols tend to assume an idealised, perfect form of encryption. This approach has been spectacularly successful in finding flaws, but when we aim for proofs of correctness then we need to consider this assumption more carefully, and perhaps to weaken it to reflect properties of real cryptographic mechanisms. This paper reviews the existing CSP approach to verifying protocols, and considers how algebraic properties of real cryptographic mechanisms can be incorporated within a rank function verification. The approach is illustrated with an authentication protocol which makes use of exclusive-or.