The Interrogator: Protocol Secuity Analysis
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering - Special issue on computer security and privacy
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
A security scheme for resource sharing over a network
Computers and Security
Design and validation of computer protocols
Design and validation of computer protocols
An automatic search for security flaws in key management schemes
Computers and Security
A note on the use of timestamps as nonces
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
Extending cryptographic logics of belief to key agreement protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering - Special issue on formal methods in software practice
Model checking for programming languages using VeriSoft
Proceedings of the 24th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Model checking
Bandera: extracting finite-state models from Java source code
Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on Software engineering
Directed diffusion: a scalable and robust communication paradigm for sensor networks
MobiCom '00 Proceedings of the 6th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
SPINS: security protocols for sensor networks
Proceedings of the 7th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
The SLAM project: debugging system software via static analysis
POPL '02 Proceedings of the 29th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
POPL '02 Proceedings of the 29th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
Wireless sensor networks: a survey
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Formal Verification of Cryptographic Protocols: A Survey
ASIACRYPT '94 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology: Advances in Cryptology
Verifying authentication protocol implementations
FMOODS '02 Proceedings of the IFIP TC6/WG6.1 Fifth International Conference on Formal Methods for Open Object-Based Distributed Systems V
The nesC language: A holistic approach to networked embedded systems
PLDI '03 Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN 2003 conference on Programming language design and implementation
CMC: a pragmatic approach to model checking real code
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review - OSDI '02: Proceedings of the 5th symposium on Operating systems design and implementation
An Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Verifier Based on Prolog Rules
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Bogor: an extensible and highly-modular software model checking framework
Proceedings of the 9th European software engineering conference held jointly with 11th ACM SIGSOFT international symposium on Foundations of software engineering
Establishing pairwise keys in distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
LEAP: efficient security mechanisms for large-scale distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
TOSSIM: accurate and scalable simulation of entire TinyOS applications
Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Embedded networked sensor systems
Verified Interoperable Implementations of Security Protocols
CSFW '06 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
SLEDE: event-based specification of sensor network security protocols
ACM SIGSOFT Software Engineering Notes
Security Protocols for Use with Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey of Security Architectures
ICWMC '07 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Wireless and Mobile Communications
Cryptographic protocol analysis on real c code
VMCAI'05 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Verification, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation
The AVISPA tool for the automated validation of internet security protocols and applications
CAV'05 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Computer Aided Verification
Towards provable secure neighbor discovery in wireless networks
Proceedings of the 6th ACM workshop on Formal methods in security engineering
Dustminer: troubleshooting interactive complexity bugs in sensor networks
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Embedded network sensor systems
Lightweight monitoring of sensor software
Proceedings of the 2009 ACM symposium on Applied Computing
Diagnostic powertracing for sensor node failure analysis
Proceedings of the 9th ACM/IEEE International Conference on Information Processing in Sensor Networks
Anquiro: enabling efficient static verification of sensor network software
Proceedings of the 2010 ICSE Workshop on Software Engineering for Sensor Network Applications
Towards a model checker for Nesc and wireless sensor networks
ICFEM'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Formal methods and software engineering
A case study in verification of embedded network software
NFM'12 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on NASA Formal Methods
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Finding flaws in security protocol implementations is hard. Finding flaws in the implementations of sensor network security protocols is even harder because they are designed to protect against more system failures compared to traditional protocols. Formal verification techniques such as model checking, theorem proving, etc, have been very successful in the past in detecting faults in security protocol specifications; however, they generally require that a formal description of the protocol, often called model, is developed before the verification can start. There are three factors that make model construction, and as a result, formal verification is hard. First, knowledge of the specialized language used to construct the model is necessary. Second, upfront effort is required to produce an artifact that is only useful during verification, which might be considered wasteful by some, and third, manual model construction is error prone and may lead to inconsistencies between the implementation and the model. The key contribution of this work is an approach for automated formal verification of sensor network security protocols. Technical underpinnings of our approach includes a technique for automatically extracting a model from the nesC implementations of a security protocol, a technique for composing this extracted model with models of intrusion and network topologies, and a technique for translating the results of the verification process to domain terms. Our approach is sound and complete within bounds, i.e. if it reports a fault scenario for a protocol, there is indeed a fault and our framework terminates for a network topology of given size; otherwise no faults in the protocol are present that can be exploited in the network topology of that size or less using the given intrusion model. Our approach also does not require upfront model construction, which significantly decreases the cost of verification.