Authentication primitives for secure protocol specifications

Authors:
C. Bodei;P. Degano;R. Focardi;C. Priami
Affiliations:
Dipartimento di Informatica, Universití di Pisa, Via Buonarroti 2, I-56125 Pisa, Italy;Dipartimento di Informatica, Universití di Pisa, Via Buonarroti 2, I-56125 Pisa, Italy;Dipartimento di Informatica, Universití Ca' Foscari di Venezia, Via Torino 155, I-30173 Venezia, Italy;Dipartimento di Informatica e Telecomunicazioni, Universití di Trento, Via Sommarive 14, I-38050 Povo (TN), Italy
Venue:
Future Generation Computer Systems - Special issue: Parallel computing technologies
Year:
2005

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Abstract

We use two authentication primitives proposed recently as a linguistic support for enforcing authentication. They offer a way of abstracting from various specifications of authentication and of obtaining idealized protocols ''secure by construction''. Consequently, they help in proving that a cryptographic protocol correctly implements its corresponding abstract version; when the implementation is incorrect, suggestions on how to fix it may come from reasoning on the abstract specification.