Verifying Authentication Protocols in CSP
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
The Theory and Practice of Concurrency
The Theory and Practice of Concurrency
Concurrent and Real Time Systems: The CSP Approach
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We use a PVS embedding of the stable failures model of CSP to verify non-repudiation protocols, allowing us to prove the correctness of properties that are difficult to analyze in full generality with a model checker. The PVS formalization comprises a semantic embedding of CSP and a collection of theorems and proof rules for reasoning about non-repudiation properties. The well-known Zhou-Gollmann protocol is analyzed within this framework.