Experts systems applied to the analysis of key management schemes
Computers and Security
An automatic search for security flaws in key management schemes
Computers and Security
A lesson on authentication protocol design
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
A Model for Secure Protocols and Their Compositions
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Verifying Authentication Protocols in CSP
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Lower and upper bounds for attacks on authentication protocols
Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Secrecy by typing in security protocols
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
Mechanized proofs for a recursive authentication protocol
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Proving Properties of Security Protocols by Induction
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Efficient Finite-State Analysis for Large Security Protocols
CSFW '98 Proceedings of the 11th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Meta-Notation for Protocol Analysis
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Invariant Generation Techniques in Cryptographic Protocol Analysis
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Temporal Rank Functions for Forward Secrecy
CSFW '05 Proceedings of the 18th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Finite-state analysis of SSL 3.0
SSYM'98 Proceedings of the 7th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 7
Verification of cryptographic Protocols: tagging enforces termination
FOSSACS'03/ETAPS'03 Proceedings of the 6th International conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computation Structures and joint European conference on Theory and practice of software
ESOP'03 Proceedings of the 12th European conference on Programming
Interpretation functions-based method to verify secrecy under equational theories
TELE-INFO'08 Proceedings of the 7th WSEAS International Conference on Telecommunications and Informatics
Secrecy of cryptographic protocols under equational theory
Knowledge-Based Systems
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This paper presents a novel approach to verify the secrecy property of cryptographic protocols. Basically, the idea is to establish sufficient conditions under which the secrecy property of a given protocol is guaranteed. The idea behind the sufficient conditions is to restrict the principals involved in the analyzed protocol so that they never decrease the security level of any piece of information when they send it over the network. For example, a principal is not allowed to protect a ''top secret'' information by a secret or a public key. Only keys having a security level greater or equal to ''top secret'' can protect ''top secret'' information. The proposed conditions can be syntactically verified on a cryptographic protocol in acceptable time. This proposed approach is general in the way that it can be applied to any cryptographic protocols and with any set of security levels (the set {public, secret, topSecret}, or the set {0,1}, etc).