Handbook of theoretical computer science (vol. B)
A lesson on authentication protocol design
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
Secrecy by typing in security protocols
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Mechanized proofs for a recursive authentication protocol
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Temporal Rank Functions for Forward Secrecy
CSFW '05 Proceedings of the 18th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Deciding knowledge in security protocols under equational theories
Theoretical Computer Science - Automated reasoning for security protocol analysis
Secrecy by interpretation functions
Knowledge-Based Systems
Sufficient Conditions for Secrecy under Any Equational Theories
ISA '08 Proceedings of the 2008 International Conference on Information Security and Assurance (isa 2008)
RTA'03 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Rewriting techniques and applications
ESOP'03 Proceedings of the 12th European conference on Programming
CRM: An efficient trust and reputation model for agent computing
Knowledge-Based Systems
Executing SQL queries over encrypted character strings in the Database-As-Service model
Knowledge-Based Systems
A formal methodology for integral security design and verification of network protocols
Journal of Systems and Software
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This paper gives a novel approach to verify the secrecy property of cryptographic protocols under equational theories. Indeed, by using the notion of interpretation functions, this paper presents some sufficient and practical conditions allowing to guarantee the secrecy property of cryptographic protocols under any equational theory. An interpretation function is a safe means by which an agent can estimate the security level of message components that he receives so that he can handle them correctly. Also, this paper proves that polynomials help a lot with the construction of an interpretation function and gives a guideline on how to construct such functions together with an example and how to use it to analyse a cryptographic protocol.