Formal Verification of the Horn-Preneel Micropayment Protocol

Authors:
Kazuhiro Ogata;Kokichi Futatsugi
Affiliations:
-;-
Venue:
VMCAI 2003 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Verification, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation
Year:
2002

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Abstract

We have formally verified that the Horn-Preneel micropayment protocol possesses an important safety property. The property, called non-overcharge property in this paper, is that a payee cannot be credited amount more than what a payer intends to pay by the broker. The verification has been done by modeling the protocol as an observational transition system considering malicious principals, describing the model in CafeOBJ, writing proof scripts showing that the protocol possesses the property in CafeOBJ, and executing the proof scripts with the CafeOBJ system. We describe the modeling of the protocol and the verification in this paper.