Knapsack problems: algorithms and computer implementations
Knapsack problems: algorithms and computer implementations
Stochastic on-line knapsack problems
Mathematical Programming: Series A and B
Methods for task allocation via agent coalition formation
Artificial Intelligence
Online computation and competitive analysis
Online computation and competitive analysis
AAAI '99/IAAI '99 Proceedings of the sixteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence and the eleventh Innovative applications of artificial intelligence conference innovative applications of artificial intelligence
Fast Approximation Algorithms for the Knapsack and Sum of Subset Problems
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Strategic negotiation in multiagent environments
Strategic negotiation in multiagent environments
Complexity and Approximation: Combinatorial Optimization Problems and Their Approximability Properties
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Adaptive limited-supply online auctions
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Computing approximate bayes-nash equilibria in tree-games of incomplete information
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Multi-issue negotiation with deadlines
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Self-interested database managers playing the view maintenance game
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
A preliminary result on a representative-based multi-round protocol for multi-issue negotiations
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
Preliminary Result on Secure Protocols for Multiple Issue Negotiation Problems
PRIMA '08 Proceedings of the 11th Pacific Rim International Conference on Multi-Agents: Intelligent Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
An analysis of feasible solutions for multi-issue negotiation involving nonlinear utility functions
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Searching for fair joint gains in agent-based negotiation
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Finding Nash bargaining solutions for multi-issue negotiations: a preliminary result
HuCom '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Working Conference on Human Factors and Computational Models in Negotiation
PRIMA '09 Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Principles of Practice in Multi-Agent Systems
Secure and efficient protocols for multiple interdependent issues negotiation
Journal of Intelligent & Fuzzy Systems: Applications in Engineering and Technology - Knowledge integration and management in autonomous systems
Multiagent and Grid Systems - Advances in Agent-mediated Automated Negotiations
Evolving optimal agendas for package deal negotiation
Proceedings of the 13th annual conference on Genetic and evolutionary computation
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
A parallel, multi-issue negotiation model in dynamic e-markets
AI'11 Proceedings of the 24th international conference on Advances in Artificial Intelligence
Using Gaussian processes to optimise concession in complex negotiations against unknown opponents
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Bilateral single-issue negotiation model considering nonlinear utility and time constraint
Decision Support Systems
A single issue negotiation model for agents bargaining in dynamic electronic markets
Decision Support Systems
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This paper analyzes bilateral multi-issue negotiation between self-interested autonomous agents. The agents have time constraints in the form of both deadlines and discount factors. There are m 1 issues for negotiation where each issue is viewed as a pie of size one. The issues are "indivisible" (i.e., individual issues cannot be split between the parties; each issue must be allocated in its entirety to either agent). Here different agents value different issues differently. Thus, the problem is for the agents to decide how to allocate the issues between themselves so as to maximize their individual utilities. For such negotiations, we first obtain the equilibrium strategies for the case where the issues for negotiation are known a priori to the parties. Then, we analyse their time complexity and show that finding the equilibrium offers is an NP-hard problem, even in a complete information setting. In order to overcome this computational complexity, we then present negotiation strategies that are approximately optimal but computationally efficient, and show that they form an equilibrium. We also analyze the relative error (i.e., the difference between the true optimum and the approximate). The time complexity of the approximate equilibrium strategies is O(nm/ε2) where n is the negotiation deadline and ε the relative error. Finally, we extend the analysis to online negotiation where different issues become available at different time points and the agents are uncertain about their valuations for these issues. Specifically, we show that an approximate equilibrium exists for online negotiation and show that the expected difference between the optimum and the approximate is O(√m). These approximate strategies also have polynomial time complexity.