Digital signatures for flows and multicasts
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
A case for end system multicast (keynote address)
Proceedings of the 2000 ACM SIGMETRICS international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Expander Graphs for Digital Stream Authentication and Robust Overlay Networks
SP '02 Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Efficient Authentication and Signing of Multicast Streams over Lossy Channels
SP '00 Proceedings of the 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Graph-Based Authentication of Digital Streams
SP '01 Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Bullet: high bandwidth data dissemination using an overlay mesh
SOSP '03 Proceedings of the nineteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
SplitStream: high-bandwidth multicast in cooperative environments
SOSP '03 Proceedings of the nineteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
DSN '04 Proceedings of the 2004 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
An integrated experimental environment for distributed systems and networks
OSDI '02 Proceedings of the 5th symposium on Operating systems design and implementationCopyright restrictions prevent ACM from being able to make the PDFs for this conference available for downloading
Defending against eclipse attacks on overlay networks
Proceedings of the 11th workshop on ACM SIGOPS European workshop
Fireflies: scalable support for intrusion-tolerant network overlays
Proceedings of the 1st ACM SIGOPS/EuroSys European Conference on Computer Systems 2006
Overcast: reliable multicasting with on overlay network
OSDI'00 Proceedings of the 4th conference on Symposium on Operating System Design & Implementation - Volume 4
OSDI '06 Proceedings of the 7th USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation - Volume 7
Chainsaw: eliminating trees from overlay multicast
IPTPS'05 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Peer-to-Peer Systems
Journal of Systems and Software
Fighting attacks in P2P live streaming: simpler is better
INFOCOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE international conference on Computer Communications Workshops
Contracts: practical contribution incentives for P2P live streaming
NSDI'10 Proceedings of the 7th USENIX conference on Networked systems design and implementation
Challenging the feasibility of authentication mechanisms for P2P live streaming
Proceedings of the 6th Latin America Networking Conference
Characterizing SopCast client behavior
Computer Communications
SimplyRep: A simple and effective reputation system to fight pollution in P2P live streaming
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
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Peer-to-peer (P2P) dissemination systems are vulnerable to attacks that may impede nodes from receiving data in which they are interested. The same properties that lead P2P systems to be scalable and efficient also lead to security problems and lack of guarantees. Within this context, live-streaming protocols deserve special attention since their time sensitive nature makes them more susceptible to the packet loss rates induced by malicious behavior. While protocols based on dissemination trees often present obvious points of attack, more recent protocols based on pulling packets from a number of different neighbors present a better chance of standing attacks. We explore this in SecureStream, a P2P live-streaming system built to tolerate malicious behavior at the end level. SecureStream is built upon Fireflies, an intrusion-tolerant membership protocol, and employs a pull-based approach for streaming data. We present the main components of SecureStream and present simulation and experimental results on the Emulab testbed that demonstrate the good resilience properties of pull-based streaming in the face of attacks. This and other techniques allow our system to be tolerant to a variety of intrusions, gracefully degrading even in the presence of a large percentage of malicious peers.