Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Irrigating ad hoc networks in constant time
Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
On the Effectiveness of Secure Overlay Forwarding Systems under Intelligent Distributed DoS Attacks
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
Defeating DDoS attacks by fixing the incentive chain
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT)
Fireflies: scalable support for intrusion-tolerant network overlays
Proceedings of the 1st ACM SIGOPS/EuroSys European Conference on Computer Systems 2006
Efficient security mechanisms for overlay multicast based content delivery
Computer Communications
OSDI '06 Proceedings of the 7th symposium on Operating systems design and implementation
Keeping Denial-of-Service Attackers in the Dark
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
SecureStream: An intrusion-tolerant protocol for live-streaming dissemination
Computer Communications
Brahms: byzantine resilient random membership sampling
Proceedings of the twenty-seventh ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Brahms: Byzantine resilient random membership sampling
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Self-stabilizing and Byzantine-tolerant overlay network
OPODIS'07 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Principles of distributed systems
FlightPath: obedience vs. choice in cooperative services
OSDI'08 Proceedings of the 8th USENIX conference on Operating systems design and implementation
Efficient security mechanisms for overlay multicast-based content distribution
ACNS'05 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
Keeping denial-of-service attackers in the dark
DISC'05 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Distributed Computing
DDoS defense mechanisms: a new taxonomy
DPM'09/SETOP'09 Proceedings of the 4th international workshop, and Second international conference on Data Privacy Management and Autonomous Spontaneous Security
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
We propose a framework and methodology for quantifyingthe effect of denial of service (DoS) attacks on a distributedsystem. We present a systematic study of the resistanceof gossip-based multicast protocols to DoS attacks.We show that even distributed and randomized gossip-basedprotocols, which eliminate single points of failure, do notnecessarily eliminate vulnerabilities to DoS attacks. Wepropose Drum - a simple gossip-based multicast protocolthat eliminates such vulnerabilities. Drum was implementedin Java and tested on a large cluster. We show,using closed-form mathematical analysis, simulations, andempirical tests, that Drum survives severe DoS attacks.