How to construct random functions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
On network-aware clustering of Web clients
Proceedings of the conference on Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer Communication
Flash crowds and denial of service attacks: characterization and implications for CDNs and web sites
Proceedings of the 11th international conference on World Wide Web
Controlling high bandwidth aggregates in the network
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Pi: A Path Identification Mechanism to Defend against DDoS Attacks
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Hop-count filtering: an effective defense against spoofed DDoS traffic
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
DSN '04 Proceedings of the 2004 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
Active internet traffic filtering: real-time response to denial-of-service attacks
ATEC '05 Proceedings of the annual conference on USENIX Annual Technical Conference
Inferring internet denial-of-service activity
SSYM'01 Proceedings of the 10th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 10
Mayday: distributed filtering for internet services
USITS'03 Proceedings of the 4th conference on USENIX Symposium on Internet Technologies and Systems - Volume 4
SOS: an architecture for mitigating DDoS attacks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Port and address hopping for active cyber-defense
PAISI'07 Proceedings of the 2007 Pacific Asia conference on Intelligence and security informatics
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We consider the problem of overcoming (Distributed) Denial of Service (DoS) attacks by realistic adversaries that can eavesdrop on messages, or parts thereof, but with some delay. We show a protocol that mitigates DoS attacks by eavesdropping adversaries, using only available, efficient packet filtering mechanisms based mainly on (addresses and) port numbers. Our protocol avoids the use of fixed ports, and instead performs ‘pseudo-random port hopping’. We model the underlying packet-filtering services and define measures for the capabilities of the adversary and for the success rate of the protocol. Using these, we analyze the proposed protocol, and show that it provides effective DoS prevention for realistic attack and deployment scenarios.