Keeping Denial-of-Service Attackers in the Dark

  • Authors:
  • Gal Badishi;Amir Herzberg;Idit Keidar

  • Affiliations:
  • -;-;-

  • Venue:
  • IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

We consider the problem of overcoming (Distributed) Denial of Service (DoS) attacks by realistic adversariesthat have knowledge of their attack' s successfulness, e.g., by observing service performance degradation,or by eavesdropping on messages or parts thereof. A solution for this problem in a high-speed networkenvironment necessitates lightweight mechanisms for differentiating between valid traffic and the attacker'spackets. The main challenge in presenting such a solution is to exploit existing packet filtering mechanismsin a way that allows fast processing of packets, but is complex enough so that the attacker cannot efficientlycraft packets that pass the filters. We show a protocol that mitigates DoS attacks by adversaries that caneavesdrop and (with some delay) adapt their attacks accordingly. The protocol uses only available, efficientpacket filtering mechanisms based mainly on addresses and port numbers. Our protocol avoids the use of fixedports, and instead performs 'pseudo-random port hopping' . We model the underlying packet-filtering servicesand define measures for the capabilities of the adversary and for the success rate of the protocol. Using these,we provide a novel rigorous analysis of the impact of DoS on an end-to-end protocol, and show that ourprotocol provides effective DoS prevention for realistic attack and deployment scenarios.