Optimization by Vector Space Methods
Optimization by Vector Space Methods
Usage-based pricing of packet data generated by a heterogeneous user population
INFOCOM '95 Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communication Societies (Vol. 2)-Volume - Volume 2
Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game
Mathematics of Operations Research
Pricing and revenue sharing strategies for Internet service providers
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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In this paper, we study optimal nonlinear pricing policy design for a monopolistic network service provider in the face of a large population of users. We assume that users have stochastic types. In [1], games with information symmetry have been considered; that is, users' true types may be public information available to all parties, or each user's true type may be private information known only to that user. In this paper, we study the intermediate case with information asymmetry; that is, users' true types are shared information among users, but are not disclosed to the service provider. The problem can be formulated as an incentive-design problem, and an ε-team optimal incentive (pricing) policy is obtained, which almost achieves Pareto optimality for the service provider. A comparative study between games with information symmetry and asymmetry are conducted as well to evaluate the service provider's game preferences.