Pricing under information asymmetry for a large population of users
Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Performance evaluation methodologies and tools
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
From network microeconomics to network infrastructure emergence
INFOCOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE international conference on Computer Communications Workshops
Asymptotic optimality for distributed spectrum sharing using bargaining solutions
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
Pricing for QoS provisioning across multiple internet service provider domains
NET-COOP'07 Proceedings of the 1st EuroFGI international conference on Network control and optimization
Near-optimal power control in wireless networks: a potential game approach
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
Subscription dynamics and competition in communications markets
Proceedings of the 2010 Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems, and Computation
Inter-domain coordination models
IFIP'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Networking
Game theoretic analysis of collusions in nonneutral networks
ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
SLA-controlled interconnection charging in next generation networks
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Entry and spectrum sharing scheme selection in femtocell communications markets
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
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One of the challenges facing the networking industry today is to increase the profitability of Internet services. This calls for economic mechanisms that can enable providers to charge more for better services and collect a fair share of the increased revenues. In this paper, we present a generic pricing model for Internet services jointly offered by a group of providers. We show that noncooperative pricing strategies may lead to unfair distribution of profit and may even discourage future upgrades to the network. As an alternative, we propose a fair revenue-sharing policy based on the weighted proportional fairness criterion. We show that this fair allocation policy encourages collaboration among providers, and hence can produce higher profits for all providers. Based on the analysis, we suggest a scalable algorithm for providers to implement this policy in a distributed way and study its convergence property.