Fair end-to-end window-based congestion control
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Pricing Communication Networks: Economics, Technology and Modelling (Wiley Interscience Series in Systems and Optimization)
Efficiency of selfish investments in network security
Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Economics of networked systems
Pricing and revenue sharing strategies for Internet service providers
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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This paper suggests that evolutionary models of network infrastructure in market economy can be derived from the underlying selfish behavior of users and providers of network services in the same way as non-equilibrium thermodynamics is derived from the underlying statistical physics of interacting particles. This approach may be useful for overcoming restrictions of existing models failing to account for the effect of the details of user/provider selfish behavior on the infrastructure evolutionary path. Network security considerations may be a part of this user/provider behavior. Our main assumption is that "almost perfect competition" keeps the system close to the "social optimum".