Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game
Mathematics of Operations Research
Inoculation strategies for victims of viruses and the sum-of-squares partition problem
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Competition and Efficiency in Congested Markets
Mathematics of Operations Research
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
From network microeconomics to network infrastructure emergence
INFOCOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE international conference on Computer Communications Workshops
Economics of malware: epidemic risks model, network externalities and incentives
Allerton'09 Proceedings of the 47th annual Allerton conference on Communication, control, and computing
How bad are selfish investments in network security?
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Interplay between security providers, consumers, and attackers: a weighted congestion game approach
GameSec'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security
Security adoption in heterogeneous networks: the influence of cyber-insurance market
IFIP'12 Proceedings of the 11th international IFIP TC 6 conference on Networking - Volume Part II
Security adoption and influence of cyber-insurance markets in heterogeneous networks
Performance Evaluation
Hi-index | 0.00 |
Internet security does not only depend on the security-related investments of individual users, but also on how these users affect each other. In a non-cooperative environment, each user chooses a level of investment to minimize its own security risk plus the cost of investment. Not surprisingly, this selfish behavior often results in undesirable security degradation of the overall system. In this paper, we first characterize the price of anarchy (POA) of network security under two models: an "Effective-investment" model, and a "Bad-traffic" model. We give insight on how the POA depends on the network topology, individual users' cost functions, and their mutual influence. We also introduce the concept of "weighted POA" to bound the region of all feasible payoffs. In a repeated game, on the other hand, users have more incentive to cooperate for their long term interests. We consider the socially best outcome that can be supported by the repeated game, and give a ratio between this outcome and the social optimum. Although the paper focuses on Internet security, many results are generally applicable to games with positive externalities.