IEEE Spectrum
Fast Approximate Graph Partitioning Algorithms
SIAM Journal on Computing
Multicommodity max-flow min-cut theorems and their use in designing approximation algorithms
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
The economics of information security investment
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
A Polylogarithmic Approximation of the Minimum Bisection
SIAM Journal on Computing
On computer viral infection and the effect of immunization
ACSAC '00 Proceedings of the 16th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
A Different Look at Secure Distributed Computation
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Journal of Computer Security - IFIP 2000
Measuring and Modeling Computer Virus Prevalence
SP '93 Proceedings of the 1993 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Expander flows, geometric embeddings and graph partitioning
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Bottleneck links, variable demand, and the tragedy of the commons
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
When selfish meets evil: byzantine players in a virus inoculation game
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
On the approximability of influence in social networks
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
On the windfall of friendship: inoculation strategies on social networks
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Efficiency of selfish investments in network security
Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Economics of networked systems
Latency-Bounded Minimum Influential Node Selection in Social Networks
WASA '09 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Wireless Algorithms, Systems, and Applications
Approximation Algorithms for the Firefighter Problem: Cuts over Time and Submodularity
ISAAC '09 Proceedings of the 20th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Information security economics - and beyond
CRYPTO'07 Proceedings of the 27th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
Mechanism design by creditability
COCOA'07 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Combinatorial optimization and applications
The complexity and approximability of minimum contamination problems
TAMC'11 Proceedings of the 8th annual conference on Theory and applications of models of computation
How bad are selfish investments in network security?
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
The price of defense and fractional matchings
ICDCN'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Distributed Computing and Networking
A graph-theoretic network security game
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Network game with attacker and protector entities
ISAAC'05 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
A derandomized approximation algorithm for the critical node detection problem
Computers and Operations Research
On the Windfall and price of friendship: Inoculation strategies on social networks
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
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We propose a simple game for modeling containment of the spread of viruses in a graph of n nodes. Each node must choose to either install anti-virus software at some known cost C, or risk infection and a loss L if a virus that starts at a random initial point in the graph can reach it without being stopped by some intermediate node. The goal of individual nodes is to minimize their individual expected cost. We prove many game theoretic properties of the model, including an easily applied characterization of Nash equilibria, culminating in our showing that allowing selfish users to choose Nash equilibrium strategies is highly undesirable, because the price of anarchy is an unacceptable Θ(n) in the worst case. This shows in particular that a centralized solution can give a much better total cost than an equilibrium solution. Though it is NP-hard to compute such a social optimum, we show that the problem can be reduced to a previously unconsidered combinatorial problem that we call the sum-of-squares partition problem. Using a greedy algorithm based on sparse cuts, we show that this problem can be approximated to within a factor of O(log2 n), giving the same approximation ratio for the inoculation game.