Correlated equilibrium and potential games
International Journal of Game Theory
CDMA uplink power control as a noncooperative game
Wireless Networks
Power Control in Wireless Cellular Networks
Foundations and Trends® in Networking
Spectrum management for interference-limited multiuser communication systems
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Measurement-based band allocation in multiband CDMA
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
Asynchronous Iterative Water-Filling for Gaussian Frequency-Selective Interference Channels
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Pricing and revenue sharing strategies for Internet service providers
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Competition in Parallel-Serial Networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Flows and Decompositions of Games: Harmonic and Potential Games
Mathematics of Operations Research
A cross-layer resource allocation scheme for ICIC in LTE-Advanced
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
A market-clearing model for spectrum trade in cognitive radio networks
MobiHoc '11 Proceedings of the Twelfth ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing
TAMC'12 Proceedings of the 9th Annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Models of Computation
Atomic congestion games on graphs and their applications in networking
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Near-Potential Games: Geometry and Dynamics
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation - Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory
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We study power control in a multi-cell CDMA wireless system whereby self-interested users share a common spectrum and interfere with each other. Our objective is to design a power control scheme that achieves a (near) optimal power allocation with respect to any predetermined network objective (such as the maximization of sum-rate, or some fairness criterion). To obtain this, we introduce the potential-game approach that relies on approximating the underlying noncooperative game with a "close" potential game, for which prices that induce an optimal power allocation can be derived. We use the proximity of the original game with the approximate game to establish through Lyapunov-based analysis that natural user-update schemes (applied to the original game) converge within a neighborhood of the desired operating point, thereby inducing near-optimal performance in a dynamical sense. Additionally, we demonstrate through simulations that the actual performance can in practice be very close to optimal, even when the approximation is inaccurate. As a concrete example, we focus on the sumrate objective, and evaluate our approach both theoretically and empirically.