The orthogonal decomposition of games and an averaging formula for the Shapley value
Mathematics of Operations Research
Canonical representation of set functions
Mathematics of Operations Research
Decomposition and representation of coalitional games
Mathematics of Operations Research
Correlated equilibrium and potential games
International Journal of Game Theory
Introduction to Linear Optimization
Introduction to Linear Optimization
Discrete multiscale vector field decomposition
ACM SIGGRAPH 2003 Papers
Sink Equilibria and Convergence
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Near-optimal power control in wireless networks: a potential game approach
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
Statistical ranking and combinatorial Hodge theory
Mathematical Programming: Series A and B - Special Issue on "Optimization and Machine learning"; Alexandre d’Aspremont • Francis Bach • Inderjit S. Dhillon • Bin Yu
Convergence and approximation in potential games
STACS'06 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Near-Potential Games: Geometry and Dynamics
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation - Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory
Hi-index | 0.00 |
In this paper we introduce a novel flow representation for finite games in strategic form. This representation allows us to develop a canonical direct sum decomposition of an arbitrary game into three components, which we refer to as the potential, harmonic, and nonstrategic components. We analyze natural classes of games that are induced by this decomposition, and in particular, focus on games with no harmonic component and games with no potential component. We show that the first class corresponds to the well-known potential games. We refer to the second class of games as harmonic games, and demonstrate that this new class has interesting properties which contrast with properties of potential games. Exploiting the decomposition framework, we obtain explicit expressions for the projections of games onto the subspaces of potential and harmonic games. This enables an extension of the equilibrium properties of potential and harmonic games to “nearby” games.