Selfish caching in distributed systems: a game-theoretic analysis
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Benefit-Based Data Caching in Ad Hoc Networks
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Multihop cellular networks: Technology and economics
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
The Design and Evaluation of Unified Cellular and Ad Hoc Networks
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Proceedings of the 28th ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Cooperative control and potential games
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part B: Cybernetics
Near-optimal power control in wireless networks: a potential game approach
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
Balancing the Trade-Offs between Query Delay and Data Availability in MANETs
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
Market sharing games applied to content distribution in ad hoc networks
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Cooperative Caching in Wireless P2P Networks: Design, Implementation, and Evaluation
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
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In this paper, the selfish caching problem in multi-hop cellular networks (MCNs) is formulated as a non-cooperative game: data caching game. Towards balancing the tradeoffs between data availability and query delay in MCNs, an incentive mechanism based upon a payment model is set up for data caching game. The data caching game is proved to be a potential game. Thus, for the game, pure Nash equilibra can be obtained and the best response dynamics converge to a pure Nash equilibrium. Moreover, by properly setting the payoff distribution rule, caching proxies have incentive to or not to cache the same data to some extent. Thereby, the performance of data availability and query delay can be tuned in an adjustable-way, which results in a desirable service performance that service provider intends to achieve.