How low can you go?: recommendations for hardware-supported minimal TCB code execution

Authors:
Jonathan M. McCune;Bryan Parno;Adrian Perrig;Michael K. Reiter;Arvind Seshadri
Affiliations:
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA;Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA;Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA;University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC;Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA
Venue:
Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems
Year:
2008

Citing 12
Cited 11

The Stanford FLASH multiprocessor

ISCA '94 Proceedings of the 21st annual international symposium on Computer architecture
Architectural support for copy and tamper resistant software

ASPLOS IX Proceedings of the ninth international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems
SETI@home: an experiment in public-resource computing

Communications of the ACM
Building the IBM 4758 Secure Coprocessor

Computer
AEGIS: architecture for tamper-evident and tamper-resistant processing

ICS '03 Proceedings of the 17th annual international conference on Supercomputing
A secure and reliable bootstrap architecture

SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Xen and the art of virtualization

SOSP '03 Proceedings of the nineteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
Modular Verification of Software Components in C

IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
BIND: A Fine-Grained Attestation Service for Secure Distributed Systems

SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Pioneer: verifying code integrity and enforcing untampered code execution on legacy systems

Proceedings of the twentieth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
Design and implementation of a TCG-based integrity measurement architecture

SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Minimal TCB Code Execution

SP '07 Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy

Flicker: an execution infrastructure for tcb minimization

Proceedings of the 3rd ACM SIGOPS/EuroSys European Conference on Computer Systems 2008
A conceptual model of self-monitoring multi-core systems

Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Workshop on Cyber Security and Information Intelligence Research
Hardware enforcement of application security policies using tagged memory

OSDI'08 Proceedings of the 8th USENIX conference on Operating systems design and implementation
Separating hypervisor trusted computing base supported by hardware

Proceedings of the fifth ACM workshop on Scalable trusted computing
A software-based root-of-trust primitive on multicore platforms

Proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
Trust extension as a mechanism for secure code execution on commodity computers

Trust extension as a mechanism for secure code execution on commodity computers
Trust extension for commodity computers

Communications of the ACM
Hypervisors: Preventing hypervisor-based rootkits with trusted execution technology

Network Security
Lockdown: towards a safe and practical architecture for security applications on commodity platforms

TRUST'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Trust and Trustworthy Computing
Iago attacks: why the system call API is a bad untrusted RPC interface

Proceedings of the eighteenth international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems
OASIS: on achieving a sanctuary for integrity and secrecy on untrusted platforms

Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.02

Visualization

Abstract

We explore the extent to which newly available CPU-based security technology can reduce the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) for security-sensitive applications. We find that although this new technology represents a step in the right direction, significant performance issues remain. We offer several suggestions that leverage existing processor technology, retain security, and improve performance. Implementing these recommendations will finally allow application developers to focus exclusively on the security of their own code, enabling it to execute in isolation from the numerous vulnerabilities in the underlying layers of legacy code.