Mitigating routing misbehavior in mobile ad hoc networks
MobiCom '00 Proceedings of the 6th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
Towards provable security for ad hoc routing protocols
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
Ariadne: a secure on-demand routing protocol for ad hoc networks
Wireless Networks
Provably Secure On-Demand Source Routing in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
The modelling and analysis of security protocols: the csp approach
The modelling and analysis of security protocols: the csp approach
Secure routing for mobile ad hoc networks
IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials
Hi-index | 0.00 |
Secure routing protocols for mobile ad hoc networks provide the required functionality for proper network operation. If the underlying routing protocol cannot be trusted to follow the protocol operations, additional trust layers, such as authentication, cannot be obtained. Threat models drive analysis capabilities, affecting how we evaluate trust. Current attacker threat models limit the results obtained during protocol security analysis over ad hoc routing protocols. Developing a proper threat model to evaluate security properties in mobile ad hoc routing protocols presents a significant challenge. If the attacker strength is too weak, we miss vital security flaws. If the attacker strength is too strong, we cannot identify the minimum required attacker capabilities needed to break the routing protocol. In this paper we present an adaptive threat model to evaluate route discovery attacks against ad hoc routing protocols. Our approach enables us to evaluate trust in the ad hoc routing process and allows us to identify minimum requirements an attacker needs to break a given routing protocol.