ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Provably secure session key distribution: the three party case
STOC '95 Proceedings of the twenty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
STOC '98 Proceedings of the thirtieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
Ariadne: a secure on-demand routing protocol for ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the 8th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Securing ad hoc routing protocols
WiSE '02 Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Wireless security
A Secure Routing Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks
ICNP '02 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
Security Goals: Packet Trajectories and Strand Spaces
FOSAD '00 Revised versions of lectures given during the IFIP WG 1.7 International School on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design: Tutorial Lectures
Foundations of Secure Interactive Computing
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Entity Authentication and Key Distribution
CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Modern Cryptography: Theory and Practice
Modern Cryptography: Theory and Practice
SEAD: Secure Efficient Distance Vector Routing for Mobile Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
WMCSA '02 Proceedings of the Fourth IEEE Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications
Efficient Authentication and Signing of Multicast Streams over Lossy Channels
SP '00 Proceedings of the 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A Model for Asynchronous Reactive Systems and its Application to Secure Message Transmission
SP '01 Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Modeling vulnerabilities of ad hoc routing protocols
Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
A Survey of Secure Wireless Ad Hoc Routing
IEEE Security and Privacy
A cryptographically sound security proof of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public-key protocol
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Provably Secure On-Demand Source Routing in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Modelling adversaries and security objectives for routing protocols in wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the fourth ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
Analysis of the SPV secure routing protocol: weaknesses and lessons
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
On identifying malicious nodes in ad hoc networks
IWCMC '07 Proceedings of the 2007 international conference on Wireless communications and mobile computing
Adaptive Threat Modeling for Secure Ad Hoc Routing Protocols
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Aggregate designated verifier signatures and application to secure routing
International Journal of Security and Networks
TSR: trust-based secure MANET routing using HMMs
Proceedings of the 4th ACM symposium on QoS and security for wireless and mobile networks
An attacker model for MANET routing security
Proceedings of the second ACM conference on Wireless network security
Inter-cluster routing authentication for ad hoc networks by a hierarchical key scheme
Journal of Computer Science and Technology
Robust and secure routing scheme for wireless multihop network
Personal and Ubiquitous Computing
Black-hole-resistant ENADAIR-based routing protocol for Mobile Ad hoc Networks
International Journal of Security and Networks
MSN'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Mobile ad-hoc and sensor networks
Formal verification of secure ad hoc routing protocols using AVISPA: ARAN case study
ECC'10 Proceedings of the 4th conference on European computing conference
A correctness proof of the SRP protocal
IPDPS'06 Proceedings of the 20th international conference on Parallel and distributed processing
Deployment of intrusion detection nodes to prevent wormhole attacks in Mobile Ad hoc Networks
International Journal of Ad Hoc and Ubiquitous Computing
Deciding security for protocols with recursive tests
CADE'11 Proceedings of the 23rd international conference on Automated deduction
Compact stimulation mechanism for routing discovery protocols in civilian ad-hoc networks
CMS'05 Proceedings of the 9th IFIP TC-6 TC-11 international conference on Communications and Multimedia Security
Provable security of on-demand distance vector routing in wireless ad hoc networks
ESAS'05 Proceedings of the Second European conference on Security and Privacy in Ad-Hoc and Sensor Networks
Analysing routing protocols: four nodes topologies are sufficient
POST'12 Proceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust
Hash chains at the basis of a secure reactive routing protocol
INTRUST'11 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Trusted Systems
A proof technique for security assessment of on-demand ad hoc routing protocols
International Journal of Security and Networks
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
We propose a formal framework for the security analysis of on-demand source routing protocols for wireless ad hoc networks. Our approach is based on the well-known simulation paradigm that has been proposed to prove the security of cryptographic protocols. Our main contribution is the application of the simulation-based approach in the context of ad hoc routing. This involves a precise definition of a real-world model, which describes the real operation of the protocol, and an ideal-world model, which captures what the protocol wants to achieve in terms of security. Both models take into account the peculiarities of wireless communications and ad hoc routing. Then, we give a formal definition of routing security in terms of indistinguishability of the two models from the point of view of honest parties. We demonstrate the usefulness of our approach by analyzing two "secure" ad hoc routing protocols, SRP and Ariadne. This analysis leads to the discovery of as yet unknown attacks against both protocols. Finally, we propose a new ad hoc routing protocol and prove it to be secure in our model.