An optimal class of symmetric key generation systems
Proc. of the EUROCRYPT 84 workshop on Advances in cryptology: theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Ariadne: a secure on-demand routing protocol for ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the 8th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
A Secure Routing Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks
ICNP '02 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
Secure Link State Routing for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
SAINT-W '03 Proceedings of the 2003 Symposium on Applications and the Internet Workshops (SAINT'03 Workshops)
Proceedings of the 9th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
A pairwise key pre-distribution scheme for wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Establishing pairwise keys in distributed sensor networks
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Establishing Pairwise Keys for Secure Communication in Ad Hoc Networks: A Probabilistic Approach
ICNP '03 Proceedings of the 11th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
Towards provable security for ad hoc routing protocols
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
HICSS '05 Proceedings of the Proceedings of the 38th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - Volume 09
Leap-Frog Packet Linking and Diverse Key Distributions for Improved Integrity in Network Broadcasts
SP '05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Ariadne: a secure on-demand routing protocol for ad hoc networks
Wireless Networks
Provably Secure On-Demand Source Routing in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Provable security of on-demand distance vector routing in wireless ad hoc networks
ESAS'05 Proceedings of the Second European conference on Security and Privacy in Ad-Hoc and Sensor Networks
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Route falsification attacks are easy to launch in mobile ad hoc networks with on demand routing protocols that employ network-wide flooding of control packets for route discoveries. To mitigate this attack, we propose a p-hop crosscheck mechanism that requires nodes p, p ≥ 2, hops apart to authenticate and verify route reply packets using pair-wise shared keys. The crosscheck can detect route falsification by non-colluding malicious nodes on-the-fly; furthermore, it can identify a group of at most p+1 nodes that contain the malicious nodes that caused the route falsification. Unlike intrusion detection techniques, which require extensive monitoring and sampling, the proposed crosscheck mechanism is light-weight and fast. Therefore, the proposed crosscheck mechanism can be used to augment the existing secure routing protocols and improve intrusion detection capability. We implemented 2-hop crosscheck for AODV in the Glomosim simulator. Using simulations, we show that 2-hop crosscheck mitigates attacks by multiple malicious nodes with negligible performance impact.