Provable security of on-demand distance vector routing in wireless ad hoc networks

Authors:
Gergely Ács;Levente Buttyán;István Vajda
Affiliations:
Laboratory of Cryptography and Systems Security (CrySyS), Department of Telecommunications, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Hungary;Laboratory of Cryptography and Systems Security (CrySyS), Department of Telecommunications, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Hungary;Laboratory of Cryptography and Systems Security (CrySyS), Department of Telecommunications, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Hungary
Venue:
ESAS'05 Proceedings of the Second European conference on Security and Privacy in Ad-Hoc and Sensor Networks
Year:
2005

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Abstract

In this paper, we propose a framework for the security analysis of on-demand, distance vector routing protocols for ad hoc networks, such as AODV, SAODV, and ARAN. The proposed approach is an adaptation of the simulation paradigm that is used extensively for the analysis of cryptographic algorithms and protocols, and it provides a rigorous method for proving that a given routing protocol is secure. We demonstrate the approach by representing known and new attacks on SAODV in our framework, and by proving that ARAN is secure in our model.