STOC '98 Proceedings of the thirtieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Power-aware routing in mobile ad hoc networks
MobiCom '98 Proceedings of the 4th annual ACM/IEEE international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Online power-aware routing in wireless Ad-hoc networks
Proceedings of the 7th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
SPINS: security protocols for sensor networks
Wireless Networks
Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing
WMCSA '99 Proceedings of the Second IEEE Workshop on Mobile Computer Systems and Applications
Universally Composable Security: A New Paradigm for Cryptographic Protocols
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A Model for Asynchronous Reactive Systems and its Application to Secure Message Transmission
SP '01 Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Modeling vulnerabilities of ad hoc routing protocols
Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
Towards provable security for ad hoc routing protocols
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
The feasibility of launching and detecting jamming attacks in wireless networks
Proceedings of the 6th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
Provable security of on-demand distance vector routing in wireless ad hoc networks
ESAS'05 Proceedings of the Second European conference on Security and Privacy in Ad-Hoc and Sensor Networks
Routing techniques in wireless sensor networks: a survey
IEEE Wireless Communications
Formal verification of secure ad hoc routing protocols using AVISPA: ARAN case study
ECC'10 Proceedings of the 4th conference on European computing conference
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The literature is very broad considering routing protocols in wireless sensor networks (WSNs). However, security of these routing protocols has fallen beyond the scope so far. Routing is a fundamental functionality in wireless networks, thus hostile interventions aiming to disrupt and degrade the routing service have a serious impact on the overall operation of the entire network. In order to analyze the security of routing protocols in a precise and rigorous way, we propose a formal framework encompassing the definition of an adversary model as well as the "general" definition of secure routing in sensor networks. Both definitions take into account the feasible goals and capabilities of an adversary in sensor environments and the variety of sensor routing protocols. In spirit, our formal model is based on the simulation paradigm that is a successfully used technique to prove the security of various cryptographic protocols. However, we also highlight some differences between our model and other models that have been proposed for wired or wireless networks. Finally, we illustrate the practical usage of our model by presenting the formal description of a simple attack against an authenticated routing protocol, which is based on the well-known TinyOS routing.