Formal verification of standards for distance vector routing protocols
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
A Secure Routing Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks
ICNP '02 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
Towards provable security for ad hoc routing protocols
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
Modelling adversaries and security objectives for routing protocols in wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the fourth ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
Formal security evaluation of ad hoc routing protocols
Formal security evaluation of ad hoc routing protocols
Modeling the optimized link-state routing protocol for verification
Proceedings of the 2012 Symposium on Theory of Modeling and Simulation - DEVS Integrative M&S Symposium
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Formal verification through model checking proved to be a very useful validation technique for security protocols: authentication, key agreement, non-repudiation, confidentiality, etc. But it has not been yet fully applied for the security properties of secure routing protocols for ad hoc networks. Few researchers had tried this approach. But they had mainly used Promela and SPIN, a tool that is relatively difficult to use. On the other hand, other researchers used formal analysis, a mathematical approach with good results but that is hard to automate. In this paper we present the use of AVISPA in this purpose. We show that the model under which the verification is made is identical to the models used by the researchers that implemented verification in SPIN or by the ones that used formal analysis. Then we present an actual verification taking as a case study ARAN secure routing protocol.