Completing the temporal picture
Selected papers of the 16th international colloquium on Automata, languages, and programming
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Ariadne: a secure on-demand routing protocol for ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the 8th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Securing ad hoc routing protocols
WiSE '02 Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Wireless security
Formal verification of standards for distance vector routing protocols
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
A Secure Routing Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks
ICNP '02 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
Secure data transmission in mobile ad hoc networks
WiSe '03 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Wireless security
A Validation Model for the DSR Protocol
ICDCSW '04 Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops - W7: EC (ICDCSW'04) - Volume 7
Modeling vulnerabilities of ad hoc routing protocols
Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
Towards provable security for ad hoc routing protocols
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
Isabelle/HOL: a proof assistant for higher-order logic
Isabelle/HOL: a proof assistant for higher-order logic
Liveness Reasoning with Isabelle/HOL
TPHOLs '09 Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on Theorem Proving in Higher Order Logics
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The correctness of a routing protocol can be divided into two parts, a liveness property proof and a safety property proof. The former requires that route(s) should be discovered and data be transmitted successfully, while the latter requires that the discovered routes have some desired characters such as containing only benign nodes. While safety properties are relatively easier to prove, the proof of liveness properties is usually harder. This paper presented a liveness proof of a secure routing protocol, SRP [11] in Isabelle/HOL [10]. The liveness property proved says that if a data package needs to be sent, then it will be sent and then received, and finally, the sender will receive an acknowledgement sent back by the receiver. There are three main contributions in this paper. Firstly, a liveness property is proved for a secure routing protocol, and this has never been done before. Secondly, our validation model can deal with arbitrarily many nodes including malicious ones, and nodes are allowed to move randomly. Thirdly, a fail set is defined to restrict the attackers' actions, so that the safety properties used to prove the liveness property can be established. The paper explains why it is reasonable to prevent malicious nodes from performing the events in fail set.