Security without identification: transaction systems to make big brother obsolete
Communications of the ACM
Zero knowledge proofs of identity
STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Rethinking Public Key Infrastructures and Digital Certificates: Building in Privacy
Rethinking Public Key Infrastructures and Digital Certificates: Building in Privacy
Design and implementation of the idemix anonymous credential system
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
An Efficient System for Non-transferable Anonymous Credentials with Optional Anonymity Revocation
EUROCRYPT '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
EUROCRYPT'91 Proceedings of the 10th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
EUROCRYPT'95 Proceedings of the 14th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
A signature scheme with efficient protocols
SCN'02 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Security in communication networks
Ring signatures: stronger definitions, and constructions without random oracles
TCC'06 Proceedings of the Third conference on Theory of Cryptography
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This paper deals with privacy-preserving (pseudonymized) access to a service resource. In such a scenario, two opposite needs seem to emerge. On one side, the service provider may want to control in first place the user accessing its resources, i.e., without being forced to delegate the management of access permissions to third parties to meet privacy requirements. On the other side, it should be technically possible to trace back the real identity of an user upon dishonest behavior, and of course this must be necessary accomplished by an external authority distinct from the provider itself. The framework described in this paper aims at coping with these two opposite needs. This is accomplished through i) a distributed third-party-based instrastructure devised to assign and manage pseudonym certificates, decoupled from ii) a two-party procedure, devised to bind an authorization permission to a pseudonym certificate with no third-party involvement. The latter procedure is based on a novel blind signature approach which allows the provider to blindly verify, at registration time, that the user possesses the private key of the still undisclosed pseudonym certificate, thus avoiding transferability of the authorization permission.