ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Prudent Engineering Practice for Cryptographic Protocols
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
A calculus for cryptographic protocols
Information and Computation
On a method of multiprogramming
On a method of multiprogramming
Strand spaces: proving security protocols correct
Journal of Computer Security
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Communications of the ACM
A Discipline of Programming
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
PROCOMET '98 Proceedings of the IFIP TC2/WG2.2,2.3 International Conference on Programming Concepts and Methods
An Elementary Derivation of the Alternating Bit Protocol
MPC '98 Proceedings of the Mathematics of Program Construction
A Hierarchy of Authentication Specifications
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Invariant Generation Techniques in Cryptographic Protocol Analysis
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Axiomatic proof techniques for parallel programs.
Axiomatic proof techniques for parallel programs.
A derivation system and compositional logic for security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Streamlining progress-based derivations of concurrent programs
Formal Aspects of Computing
Incremental verification of owicki/gries proof outlines using PVS
ICFEM'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Formal Methods and Software Engineering
Progress in deriving concurrent programs: emphasizing the role of stable guards
MPC'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Mathematics of Program Construction
Systematic design of a family of attack-resistant authentication protocols
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Calculating and composing progress properties in terms of the leads-to relation
ICFEM'07 Proceedings of the formal engineering methods 9th international conference on Formal methods and software engineering
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In this work we explore the applicability of the programming method of Feijen and van Gasteren to the construction of security protocols. This method addresses the derivation of concurrent programs from a formal specification, and it is based on common notions like invariants and pre- and post-conditions. We show that fundamental security concepts like secrecy and authentication can nicely be specified in this way. Using some small extensions, the style of formal reasoning from this method can be applied to the security domain. To demonstrate our approach, we discuss an authentication protocol and a public-key distribution protocol, and we deal with their composition. Although this work does not contain any new protocols, it does offer a new view on describing, constructing and reasoning about security protocols.