Systematic design of a family of attack-resistant authentication protocols

  • Authors:
  • R. Bird;I. Gopal;A. Herzberg;P. A. Janson;S. Kutten;R. Molva;M. Yung

  • Affiliations:
  • IBM Corp., Res. Triangle Park, NC;-;-;-;-;-;-

  • Venue:
  • IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

Most existing designs for two-way cryptographic authentication protocols suffer from one or more limitations. Among other things, they require synchronization of local clocks, they are subject to export restrictions because of the way they use cryptographic functions, and they are not amenable to use in lower layers of network protocols because of the size and complexity of messages they use. Designing suitable cryptographic protocols that cater to large and dynamic network communities but do not suffer from these problems presents substantial problems. It is shown how a few simple protocols, including one proposed by ISO, can easily be broken, and properties that authentication protocols should exhibit are derived. A methodology for systematically building and testing the security of a family of cryptographic two-way authentication protocols that are as simple as possible yet resistant to a wide class of attacks, efficient, easy to implement and use, and amenable to many different networking environments is described. Examples of protocols of that family that presents various advantages in specific distributed system scenarios are discussed