Self-certified Sybil-free pseudonyms

Authors:
Leonardo A. Martucci;Markulf Kohlweiss;Christer Andersson;Andriy Panchenko
Affiliations:
Karlstad University, Karlstad, Sweden;Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, Belgium;Combitech, Karlstad, Sweden;RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany
Venue:
WiSec '08 Proceedings of the first ACM conference on Wireless network security
Year:
2008

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Abstract

Accurate and trusted identifiers are a centerpiece for any security architecture. Protecting against Sybil attacks in a privacy-friendly manner is a non-trivial problem in wireless infrastructureless networks, such as mobile ad hoc networks. In this paper, we introduce self-certified Sybil-free pseudonyms as a means to provide privacy-friendly Sybil-freeness without requiring continuous online availability of a trusted third party. These pseudonyms are self-certified and computed by the users themselves from their cryptographic long term identities. Contrary to identity certificates, we preserve location privacy and improve protection against some notorious attacks on anonymous communication systems.