A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
An interactive identification scheme based on discrete logarithms and factoring (extended abstract)
EUROCRYPT '90 Proceedings of the workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
SIAM Journal on Computing
Cryptography: Theory and Practice,Second Edition
Cryptography: Theory and Practice,Second Edition
Digital Signature Schemes: General Framework and Fail-Stop Signatures
Digital Signature Schemes: General Framework and Fail-Stop Signatures
New Constructions of Fail-Stop Signatures and Lower Bounds (Extended Abstract)
CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
The Hardness of Hensel Lifting: The Case of RSA and Discrete Logarithm
ASIACRYPT '02 Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
RSA-Based Fail-Stop Signature Schemes
ICPP '99 Proceedings of the 1999 International Workshops on Parallel Processing
Discrete Logarithms and Factoring
Discrete Logarithms and Factoring
Public-key cryptosystems based on composite degree residuosity classes
EUROCRYPT'99 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
An efficient fail-stop signature scheme based on factorization
ICISC'02 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information security and cryptology
Short fail-stop signature scheme based on factorization and discrete logarithm assumptions
Theoretical Computer Science
ASCDS: a smartphone confidential data storage scheme
International Journal of Wireless and Mobile Computing
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The security of ordinary digital signature schemes relies on a computational assumption. Fail-stop signature (FSS) schemes provide security for a forger with unlimited computational power by enabling the sender to provide a proof of forgery if it occurs. An attractive construction of FSS scheme based on factorisation is the RSA-based FSS schemes published in IWSEC '99, which allows the signer to provide a non-trivial factor of the modulus in the case of forgery. In this paper, firstly we review some remarks on the RSA-based FSS schemes, including a recently proposed 'attack' which is incorrect. We note that the proposed scheme is not provably secure. Then we incorporate Hensel lifting techniques to create a provably secure variant of the scheme. As a result, our scheme is provably secure and has an explicit proof of forgery by allowing the sender to reveal the non-trivial factor of the modulus in the case of forgery. Among the existing FSS schemes based on the factorisation, our scheme is the only scheme which provides an explicit proof of forgery together with a provable security. We provide a complete security proof of our scheme.