The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
Wide area traffic: the failure of Poisson modeling
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
An analysis of security incidents on the Internet 1989-1995
An analysis of security incidents on the Internet 1989-1995
Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Tarzan: a peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
From a Trickle to a Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types
IH '02 Revised Papers from the 5th International Workshop on Information Hiding
SNDSS '96 Proceedings of the 1996 Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security (SNDSS '96)
P5: A Protocol for Scalable Anonymous Communication
SP '02 Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Statistical Identification of Encrypted Web Browsing Traffic
SP '02 Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Anonymous Connections and Onion Routing
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Random-data perturbation techniques and privacy-preserving data mining
Knowledge and Information Systems
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
The traffic analysis of continuous-time mixes
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
On flow correlation attacks and countermeasures in mix networks
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Wireless telemedicine and m-health: technologies, applications and research issues
International Journal of Sensor Networks
The effect of leaders on the consistency of group behaviour
International Journal of Sensor Networks
Security and Communication Networks
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Mix networks are designed to provide anonymity for users in a variety of applications, including privacy-preserving WWW browsing and numerous e-commerce systems. Such networks have been shown to be susceptible to a number of statistical traffic analysis attacks. Among these are flow correlation attacks, where an adversary may disclose the communication relationship between a sender and a receiver by measuring the similarity between the sender's outbound flow and the receiver's inbound flow. The effectiveness of the attacks is measured in terms of the probability that an adversary correctly recognises the receiver. This paper describes a model for the flow correlation attack effectiveness. Our results illustrate the quantitative relationship among system parameters such as sample size, noise level, payload flow rate and attack effectiveness. Our analysis quantitatively reveals how, under certain situations, existing flow-based anonymous systems would fail under flow-correlation attacks, thus providing useful guidelines for the design of future anonymous systems.