The subliminal channel and digital signatures
Proc. of the EUROCRYPT 84 workshop on Advances in cryptology: theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Trading group theory for randomness
STOC '85 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A secure subliminal channel (?)
Lecture notes in computer sciences; 218 on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO 85
Demonstrating possession of a discrete logarithm without revealing it
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
Subliminal-free authentication and signature
Lecture Notes in Computer Science on Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT'88
Non-interactive zero-knowledge and its applications
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Multi-prover interactive proofs: how to remove intractability assumptions
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The knowledge complexity of interactive proof systems
SIAM Journal on Computing
Abuses in cryptography and how to fight them
CRYPTO '88 Proceedings on Advances in cryptology
Proofs that yield nothing but their validity and a methodology of cryptographic protocol design
SFCS '86 Proceedings of the 27th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Simmons' protocol is not free of subliminal channels
CSFW '96 Proceedings of the 9th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
[Sim84] introduced the concept of subliminal channel in the context of signature systems. [Des88b] presented a solution against subliminal channels and extended in [Des88a] the solution to abuse-free coin-flipping, abuse-free generation of public keys, and abuse-free zero-knowledge. In this paper we demonstrate that a whole family of systems (generalized Arthur-Merlin games) can be made abuse-free, avoiding the exhaustive approach of [Des88a]. We will hereto formalize the concept of abuse.