The subliminal channel and digital signatures
Proc. of the EUROCRYPT 84 workshop on Advances in cryptology: theory and application of cryptographic techniques
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STOC '85 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
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Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
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STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
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CRYPTO '85 Advances in Cryptology
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SP '83 Proceedings of the 1983 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
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CRYPTO '88 Proceedings on Advances in cryptology
EUROCRYPT '90 Proceedings of the workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
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A General Zero-Knowledge Scheme
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How to Utilize the Randomness of Zero-Knowledge Proofs
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Simmons' protocol is not free of subliminal channels
CSFW '96 Proceedings of the 9th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
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Information Processing Letters
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Information Security and Cryptology
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Digital Watermarking and Steganography
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EUROCRYPT'92 Proceedings of the 11th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
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IH'06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information hiding
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Computers & Mathematics with Applications
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FC'06 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Cryptography and Security
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Simmons [17] introduced the notion of subliminal channel in 1983, by demonstrating how to "hide" secret information inside an authenticated message. In this paper we propose a practical subliminal-free authentication system and extend our results to subliminal-free signatures. The subliminal-freeness of our systems can be proven. We discuss applications in the context of verification of treaty and international bank communications.