Authentication theory/coding theory
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
Status report on factoring (at the Sandia National Labs)
Proc. of the EUROCRYPT 84 workshop on Advances in cryptology: theory and application of cryptographic techniques
The subliminal channel and digital signatures
Proc. of the EUROCRYPT 84 workshop on Advances in cryptology: theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Subliminal-free authentication and signature
Lecture Notes in Computer Science on Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT'88
Abuses in cryptography and how to fight them
CRYPTO '88 Proceedings on Advances in cryptology
A new family of authentication protocols
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
A Natural Taxonomy for Digital Information Authentication Schemes
CRYPTO '87 A Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques on Advances in Cryptology
Simmons' protocol is not free of subliminal channels
CSFW '96 Proceedings of the 9th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
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In a series of papers, the author has documentedthe evolution at the Sandia National Laboratoriesof a solution to the problem of how two mutuallydeceitful and distrusting parties -- the hostand the monitor -- can both trust a data acquisitionsystem whose function is to inform the monitor,and perhaps third parties, whether the hosthas or has not violated the terms of a treaty. Thenational interests of the various participants,host, monitor and third parties, at first appear tobe mutually irreconcilable, however the conclusionof this paper will be that it is possible to simultaneouslysatisfy the interests of all parties. Thetechnical device on which this fourth, and hopefullyfinal, iteration of treaty verification systemsis based is the concatenation of two or moretwo key cryptographic systems. In the resultingsystem no part of the rneasage need be kept secretfrom any participant at anytime; no party, nor collusionof fewer than all of the parties can utteran undetectable forgery;no unilateral action onthe part of any party can lessen the confidence ofthe others as to the authenticity of the data andfinally third parties can be logically persuadedof the authenticity of messages. Thus, finallyafter a decade of development a complete technicalsolution is in hand for the problem of the verificationof treaty compliance.