Delegating responsibility in digital systems: Horton's "who done it?"

Authors:
Mark S. Miller;James E. Donnelley;Alan H. Karp
Affiliations:
Google Research;NERSC, LBNL;Hewlett-Packard Labs
Venue:
HOTSEC'07 Proceedings of the 2nd USENIX workshop on Hot topics in security
Year:
2007

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Abstract

Programs do good things, but also do bad, making software security more than a fad. The authority of programs, we do need to tame. But bad things still happen. Who do we blame? From the very beginnings of access control: Should we be safe by construction, or should we patrol? Horton shows how, in an elegant way, we can simply do both, and so save the day.