Emerging collective behavior in a simple artificial financial market
Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Simulating the effects of sanctioning for the emergence of cooperation in a public goods game
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
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In public goods games individuals contribute to create a benefit for a group. Unfortunately they also attract free-riders who enjoy the benefits without contributing. Despite this, in reality, cooperation does not collapse. Several explanations exist for this phenomenon. In our work, individual behavioral rules play an important role in the emergence of a global, cooperative behavior. In our setting, the individual contribution depends on the motivational level of the individual, which depends on the wealth of neighbors. This in turn is associated with the wealth of the whole society. Previous works have used global persistence to analyze that wealth. Here we introduce new elements in the study of the public goods game, trying to bring the model closer to real world situations. We start by analysing the behavior of agents when they interact in a grid. Further, we introduce competition in the game, i.e. agents can select to contribute to two public goods, instead of just one. Results show an increase in wealth, hence in cooperation, when agents perform coordinated selections of goods, and when they imitate the neighbor with highest wealth.