The design and implementation of a log-structured file system
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
A cryptographic file system for UNIX
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
The Design and Implementation of a Transparent Cryptographic File System for UNIX
Proceedings of the FREENIX Track: 2001 USENIX Annual Technical Conference
Adding Secure Deletion to Your Favorite File System
SISW '05 Proceedings of the Third IEEE International Security in Storage Workshop
Secure deletion myths, issues, and solutions
Proceedings of the second ACM workshop on Storage security and survivability
Secure deletion for a versioning file system
FAST'05 Proceedings of the 4th conference on USENIX Conference on File and Storage Technologies - Volume 4
Secure data deletion for Linux file systems
SSYM'01 Proceedings of the 10th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 10
Secure deletion of data from magnetic and solid-state memory
SSYM'96 Proceedings of the 6th conference on USENIX Security Symposium, Focusing on Applications of Cryptography - Volume 6
SSYM'96 Proceedings of the 6th conference on USENIX Security Symposium, Focusing on Applications of Cryptography - Volume 6
Storage alternatives for mobile computers
OSDI '94 Proceedings of the 1st USENIX conference on Operating Systems Design and Implementation
Keeping data secret under full compromise using porter devices
Proceedings of the 26th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Reliably erasing data from flash-based solid state drives
FAST'11 Proceedings of the 9th USENIX conference on File and stroage technologies
TrueErase: per-file secure deletion for the storage data path
Proceedings of the 28th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
ASCDS: a smartphone confidential data storage scheme
International Journal of Wireless and Mobile Computing
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In most file systems, if a file is deleted, only the metadata of the file is deleted or modified and the file's data is still stored on the physical media. Some users require that deleted files no longer be accessible. This requirement is more important in embedded systems that employ flash memory as a storage medium. In this paper, we have designed a NAND flash file system that has a secure deletion functionality. We modified YAFFS to support secure deletion. Our method uses encryption to delete files and forces all keys of a specific file to be stored in the same block. Therefore, only one erase operation is required to securely delete a file. The proposed method securely deletes not only keys but also all of the metadata of that file. Our simulation results show that the number of block erases due to file creation and file modification is very low and the amortized number of block erases is lower than the simple encryption method. Even though we applied our method only to the YAFFS, our method can be easily applied to other NAND flash file systems.