TrueErase: per-file secure deletion for the storage data path

  • Authors:
  • Sarah Diesburg;Christopher Meyers;Mark Stanovich;Michael Mitchell;Justin Marshall;Julia Gould;An-I Andy Wang;Geoff Kuenning

  • Affiliations:
  • Florida State University;Florida State University;Florida State University;Florida State University;Florida State University;Florida State University;Florida State University;Harvey Mudd College

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 28th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
  • Year:
  • 2012

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Abstract

The ability to securely delete sensitive data from electronic storage is becoming important. However, current per-file deletion solutions tend to be limited to a segment of the operating system's storage data path or specific to particular file systems or storage media. This paper introduces TrueErase, a holistic secure-deletion framework. Through its design, implementation, verification, and evaluation, TrueErase shows that it is possible to build a legacy-compatible full-storage-data-path framework that performs per-file secure deletion and works with common file systems and solid-state storage, while handling common system failures. In addition, this framework can serve as a building block for encryption- and tainting-based secure-deletion systems.