A game theoretic framework for bandwidth allocation and pricing in broadband networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
A Game Theoretic Framework for Incentives in P2P Systems
P2P '03 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing
Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A game theoretic approach to provide incentive and service differentiation in P2P networks
Proceedings of the joint international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Performance Modeling of P2P File Sharing Applications
FIRB-PERF '05 Proceedings of the 2005 Workshop on Techniques, Methodologies and Tools for Performance Evaluation of Complex Systems
Nash Equilibria of Packet Forwarding Strategies in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Free-riding and whitewashing in peer-to-peer systems
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Incentives for large peer-to-peer systems
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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In peer-to-peer networks, peers act as clients and servers, i.e., they can download files from others and allow others to download from them, at the same time. Since the bandwidth of a peer acting as server is shared among all its clients, the download rate experienced by a peer depends on the server choices of the other peers. We focus our investigation on the bandwidth allocation among the peers and model this system with non-cooperative game theory. We assume that peers are rational players that maximize their utility, corresponding to minimize their download time. We study the existence of Nash equilibrium points under a very simple server selection policy and show that it is efficiency from the point of view of the bandwidth utilization.